US officials claimed that Venezuela's Tren de Aragua (TdA) gang posed a significant threat to national security, but internal records suggest a different story.
According to hundreds of documents obtained by WIRED, the US intelligence community had a poor understanding of the group's activities in the country. Intelligence taskings and law enforcement bulletins described fragmented and low-level crime, rather than a coordinated terrorist threat.
The documents show that agencies struggled to determine whether TdA even functioned as an organized entity in the US at all. Analysts repeatedly cited "intelligence gaps" in understanding how the group operated on US soil, including questions about its size, financing, and weapons access.
In contrast to public statements from senior officials, field-level reporting portrayed TdA as a profit-driven criminal group with no indication of centralized command or strategic coordination. The gang's activities were largely described as opportunistic and mundane, ranging from smash-and-grab burglaries to delivery-app fraud.
US Attorney General Pam Bondi claimed that TdA was a "foreign arm of the Venezuelan government" with a "command structure," but this assessment was not supported by internal records. The Border Patrol assessment obtained by WIRED showed officials could not substantiate these claims, relying instead on interview-based estimates rather than confirmed detections of gang members entering the US.
The tasking order issued by national intelligence managers in May 2025 highlighted unresolved questions about TdA's activities, including its size, financing, and weapons access. The directive also noted that analysts were unsure whether US-based TdA members operated under the direction of foreign-based leadership.
Similar limits on understanding surfaced in records from White House-run interagency task forces, known as HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas). These reports failed to identify a sprawling narco-terror enterprise publicly described by senior officials and instead portrayed TdA activity as "street level."
In contrast, assessments by Customs and Border Protection ranked TdA among the most capable foreign terrorist groups, but acknowledged that it had no knowledge of any specific or credible threat. The agency noted that its detection methods identified only 83 known TdA members at the border over a 22-month period.
The reports also showed that TdA members were exploiting food delivery and rideshare platforms as a source of income and a means to allegedly facilitate routine criminal activity. However, these claims were often made with low confidence language and vague attribution.
In conclusion, the internal records suggest that the US intelligence community had a poor understanding of TdA's activities in the country, which was not supported by public statements from senior officials. The reports highlight unresolved questions about the group's size, financing, and weapons access, as well as its potential response to pressure.
According to hundreds of documents obtained by WIRED, the US intelligence community had a poor understanding of the group's activities in the country. Intelligence taskings and law enforcement bulletins described fragmented and low-level crime, rather than a coordinated terrorist threat.
The documents show that agencies struggled to determine whether TdA even functioned as an organized entity in the US at all. Analysts repeatedly cited "intelligence gaps" in understanding how the group operated on US soil, including questions about its size, financing, and weapons access.
In contrast to public statements from senior officials, field-level reporting portrayed TdA as a profit-driven criminal group with no indication of centralized command or strategic coordination. The gang's activities were largely described as opportunistic and mundane, ranging from smash-and-grab burglaries to delivery-app fraud.
US Attorney General Pam Bondi claimed that TdA was a "foreign arm of the Venezuelan government" with a "command structure," but this assessment was not supported by internal records. The Border Patrol assessment obtained by WIRED showed officials could not substantiate these claims, relying instead on interview-based estimates rather than confirmed detections of gang members entering the US.
The tasking order issued by national intelligence managers in May 2025 highlighted unresolved questions about TdA's activities, including its size, financing, and weapons access. The directive also noted that analysts were unsure whether US-based TdA members operated under the direction of foreign-based leadership.
Similar limits on understanding surfaced in records from White House-run interagency task forces, known as HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas). These reports failed to identify a sprawling narco-terror enterprise publicly described by senior officials and instead portrayed TdA activity as "street level."
In contrast, assessments by Customs and Border Protection ranked TdA among the most capable foreign terrorist groups, but acknowledged that it had no knowledge of any specific or credible threat. The agency noted that its detection methods identified only 83 known TdA members at the border over a 22-month period.
The reports also showed that TdA members were exploiting food delivery and rideshare platforms as a source of income and a means to allegedly facilitate routine criminal activity. However, these claims were often made with low confidence language and vague attribution.
In conclusion, the internal records suggest that the US intelligence community had a poor understanding of TdA's activities in the country, which was not supported by public statements from senior officials. The reports highlight unresolved questions about the group's size, financing, and weapons access, as well as its potential response to pressure.