The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been found to have improperly kept Chicago Police Department records for seven months, violating domestic espionage rules. The data was collected by DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) as part of an experiment to test if police files could be fed into the FBI watchlist. The records included information on roughly 900 residents accused of gang ties.
The I&A field officer who initiated the transfer had left their post, leaving a staffing gap that went unaddressed. The data was stored on a federal server without proper oversight, and it wasn't deleted as required by law until November 21, 2023.
An investigation found that nearly 800 files were kept in violation of DHS's own rules, breaching domestic intelligence operations designed to prevent targeting legal US residents. The experiment collapsed due to mismanagement and oversight failures.
The lapse highlights the failure of federal intelligence officers to sidestep local sanctuary laws. Spencer Reynolds, a senior counsel at the Brennan Center, notes that this episode illustrates how federal agencies can circumvent policies protecting residents from immigration enforcement.
The incident also raises concerns about the scope of watch-listing activities and their potential impact on millions of Americans. The inclusion of data on US citizens in the Terrorist Screening Dataset has been criticized for its potential to justify targeting family members, churches, food banks, and others who support immigrants.
A subsequent review by Congress found that I&A still lacks basic controls needed to track how intelligence is collected and used. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in July that I&A's internal list of offices conducting intelligence work hadn't been updated in nine years, leading to fragmented policy and compliance.
The DHS has pledged new procedures and set deadlines stretching into the new year, but it remains unclear what corrective steps were ultimately taken following the incident.
The I&A field officer who initiated the transfer had left their post, leaving a staffing gap that went unaddressed. The data was stored on a federal server without proper oversight, and it wasn't deleted as required by law until November 21, 2023.
An investigation found that nearly 800 files were kept in violation of DHS's own rules, breaching domestic intelligence operations designed to prevent targeting legal US residents. The experiment collapsed due to mismanagement and oversight failures.
The lapse highlights the failure of federal intelligence officers to sidestep local sanctuary laws. Spencer Reynolds, a senior counsel at the Brennan Center, notes that this episode illustrates how federal agencies can circumvent policies protecting residents from immigration enforcement.
The incident also raises concerns about the scope of watch-listing activities and their potential impact on millions of Americans. The inclusion of data on US citizens in the Terrorist Screening Dataset has been criticized for its potential to justify targeting family members, churches, food banks, and others who support immigrants.
A subsequent review by Congress found that I&A still lacks basic controls needed to track how intelligence is collected and used. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in July that I&A's internal list of offices conducting intelligence work hadn't been updated in nine years, leading to fragmented policy and compliance.
The DHS has pledged new procedures and set deadlines stretching into the new year, but it remains unclear what corrective steps were ultimately taken following the incident.